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Autonomy has been one of the most crucial concepts 
in moral philosophy since the Enlightenment; it has been 
equal1y important in the forms of moral practice that 
have developed during that time, in particular, in the 
drive for more democratic social structures. And its 
importance hasn't flagged, in either theory or practice, 
in our culture's most recent reflections about the nature 
and demands of ethics. But at the same time it is a 
highly contentious concept, both in terms of how it 
should be understood, and of its implications for how 
we ought to live our lives. In these remarks I will 
establish a context designed to underscore both the 
continuing significance and the continuing controversy 
·surrounding autonomy. 
The Idea of Autonomy: A Rough Characterization 
A "smooth" characterization of autonomy would 
require a great deal of space to work out and defend, 
and would still be subject to disagreement. But the 
conceptual neighborhood autonomy occupies can be 
indicated fairly succinctly: Autonomy involves the 
notion of being free to choose one's own values and 
actions. This is a familiar idea, and one whose moral 
importance is fairly apparent, at least in our time and 
place: We feel the loss of something very important if 
we are deprived of our liberty. Ifour choices or actions 
are manipulated by the force or the deception of others, 
we tend to feel as though our importance as persons is 
too cheaply regarded. 
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If the idea of autonomy is readily accessible, some 
of its complexities lie pretty close to the surface as well: 
Even without blatant force or fraud, how free are we 
real1y to choose and act on those choices? What is the 
bearing of our environment and our genetic heritage on 
what we wish and what we do? Can such influences be 
resisted? To what extent is the viability of autonomy 
as a moral notion dependent on human life's not being 
determined by causal regularities? 
Most moral examinations of autonomy proceed as 
though there were satisfactory answers to these 
questions in place, and to a large extent, this is true of 
this symposium as well. It is more directly to the present 
point to sketch out the lines of another dispute: How 
and why is autonomy morally significant at all? 
The Significance of Autonomy: 
Views from Moral Theory 
There are two major positions on this issue. Some 
thinkers regard autonomy as morally significant 
intrinsically. The most uncompromising proponent of 
this view historical1y is probably Immanuel Kant, who 
regarded the possession of autonomy as essential for 
having any moral standing at all; once possessed it has 
an overriding impact on the ways that one should be 
treated. As Kant would have it, an autonomous being 
is a person, and persons ought never be treated solely 
as means to ends but always as "ends in themselves." 
Kant saw any being or action that was not autonomous, 
but simply a part of the closed, causally detennined 
system of Nature, as without moral worth. Nonhuman 
animals, therefore, are without any direct moral standing 
for Kant, although we do need to take care about how 
our treatment of animals might influence our behavior 
toward other persons. Contemporary philosophers 
influenced by Kant do not necessarily follow him in 
denying any moral standing to nonautonomous beings 
or actions, but they tend to agree that autonomy is crucial 
to the possession of moral rights. 
The tradition in moral theory more heavily indebted 
to John Stuart Mill-utilitarianism-regards autonomy 
as important not in itself, but because of its important 
contributions to what is important in itself. If, for 
instance, one takes happiness to be the only things that 
is an intrinsic good, then autonomy is morally important 
just to the extent that honoring it leads to greater 
happiness. Mill and others have argued that respecting 
the autonomy of human beings is strongly conducive 
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to happiness, for an adult can be generally presumed to 
know her own interests better than others will, and 
because, as noted earlier, being coerced by others, even 
if their motivation is benevolent, typically makes us 
very unhappy. 
It is worth noting that because this tradition in moral 
theory sees traits other than autonomy as ethically 
important, it is often more hospitable to nonhuman 
animals (on the widely shared assumption that the 
relevant senses of autonomy do not apply to 
nonhumans). 
Both broad concepts of autonomy have been 
influential in recent movements of moral reform, with 
interesting results for both our moral practice, and our 
moral understanding. 
The Significance of Autonomy: 
Views from Contemporary Social Movements 
The idea ofautonomy has played a major role in many 
of the social practices that have recently undergone rapid 
and significant change. Three social movements-
patients' rights, the women's movement, and the 
movement to liberate animals-are particularly 
instructive. 
In health care, both legal and moral theory, followed 
(to some extent) by clinical practice, have moved 
decisively away from the paternalistic idea that "doctor 
knows best" about the kind of health care decisions that 
ought to be made for a patient, and toward the notion 
that the free and informed consent of patients is a basic 
requisite for acceptable medical interactions. A parallel 
shift seems to lie at the heart of the women's movement; 
it has rejected the idea that women's lives and choices 
should be determined by a patriarchal system that 
subordinates their interests to those of men. Similarly, 
many animal liberationists have insisted that we 
abandon the notion that animals are simply there for 
our use, even if we avoid cruelty in our dealings with 
them. Animals have lives of their own, on this view, 
and aren't just means to our ends. 
All this is clearly a movement in the direction of 
greater respect for the autonomy of patients, of women, 
and of nonhumans. But while appeal to the moral 
importance of respecting autonomy has figured 
importantly in these and other movements for moral 
change, all three have yielded problems and insights 
that have made the concept of autonomy seem even 
more complex and problematic. 
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Agood deal ofcontemporary health care, for example, 
is directed toward the no-longer autonomous, the not-yet 
autonomous, those who will never be autonomous, and 
those of diminished autonomy. Many medical ethicists 
maintain that an autonomous person's "moral advantage, 
is restricted to her being (in general) an authoritative 
source of information concerning her values, and hence, 
an authoritative decision-maker. Those who lack 
autonomy cannot occupy that role, but there is an equal 
moral obligation to tailor treatment decisions to the 
patient's values, not those of her caregivers; the trick, of 
course, is to determine what those values are. 
Many feminist theorists have in recent years expressed 
real concern about the logical, causal, and metaphorical 
implications of autonomy, or at least of certain 
understandings of the notion. They are suspicious that 
an ethic centered on autonomy presents a too highly 
individualized picture of moral relationships-at least, 
too highly individualized to accurately represent the moral 
situations characteristic of women-and that a focus on 
autonomy tends to discourage taking proper moral 
account of the value of concern and connectedness, of 
compassion and care. 
And finally, the animal liberation movement has 
contributed to reconsiderations of both autonomy's 
range and its importance. It has explored the 
implications of the fact that nonhumans have strong 
preferences and can make choices reflecting them. Also, 
along with feminist theorists and medical ethicists, 
philosophers interested in animals have suggested that 
autonomy may need to be taken down a peg or two as a 
determinant of moral standing. 
It is this second theme that ProfessorComstock explores 
in his paper. Fixing on a particular analysis ofautonomy-
that provided by R. G. Frey-he attempts to demonstrate 
that a human life may fail to be autonomous in that sense, 
yetbe worthy of moral respectand protection. He suggests 
further that some of the moral qualities we respect in his 
exemplar, a woman named Carrie, may be due to her very 
lack ofautonomy, as Frey canceives ofit The implication 
of Professor Comstock's paper is clear: Ifa human being 
needn't possess autonomy for her life to be considered 
with moral respect, there is no justification for regarding 
autonomy as the secular analog to the traditional notion 
ofan immortal soul-the "bright line" separating humans 
from nonhumans that allows us to manipulate and end 
animal lives with impunity. 
Professor Francis' commentary raises questions 
about whether Comstock's understanding ofautonomy 
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is overly individualistic, linking the notion too closely 
to "a rejection of background and tradition." She also 
suggests that Carrie's life might well be enhanced were 
both she and others to have a greater respect for her 
autonomy, and ends by claiming that line drawing is 
not the appropriate metaphor for sorting out the moral 
complexities of intraspecific ethics. 
Professor Sapontzis, like Comstock, reads Frey as 
asserting that autonomy is a crucially important 
determinant of a being's moral standing, but can find 
no justification for assigning it such an overweening 
status. As Sapontzis sees it, valorizing autonomy is a 
result of either logical errors, or of arbitrarily insisting 
that the preferences of a subclass of human beings ought 
to be a universally valid standard of moral worth. 
Furthermore, even were Frey able to show that 
possessing autonomy did confer on human beings 
"moral superiority," it would not follow that humans 
had the right to exploit and kill nonhumans. 
Professor Frey* has many reservations about 
Comstock's analysis-he is not convinced, for instance, 
that Carrie's life is bereft of autonomy in the same way 
that the lives ofnonhumans are-but his main objection 
is that his position has been misconstrued. As a 
utilitarian, he does not assign to autonomy any kind of 
"trump card" status. Possessing autonomy does not 
guarantee the inviolability of one's life or other interests 
against sufficiently important competing interests. Nor 
does lacking it render a being without moral value. 
All these essays inspire reflection on how to refine 
our understanding ofautonomy, and on why it is morally 
important. Such activity is a genuine contribution to 
moral discourse about the place of nonhumans in a 
secular, pluralistic society. 
* Professor Frey's commentary, presented at the 
March, 1990 Society for the Study of Ethics and 
Animals meeting, was not available for publication. 
Pigs are the breath of the mud, 
the bristly warmth of tough skin, 
the outcome of ovals and curves. 
Pigs are earth movers, 
rooting for what is buried-
philosophers' stones, sapphires, gold-
which things pigs know are found 
with the worms, the grubs, and the snails. 
Pigs love life, 
the touching of snouts, 
the squealing of throats, 
the unimportance of eyes. 
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